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WhyWe Should Not Be Indifferent to
Specification Choices for Difference-
in-Differences
AndrewM. Ryan, James F. Burgess Jr., and Justin B. Dimick
Objective. To evaluate the effects of specification choices on the accuracy of estimates
in difference-in-differences (DID) models.
Data Sources. Process-of-care quality data from Hospital Compare between 2003
and 2009.
Study Design. We performed a Monte Carlo simulation experiment to estimate the
effect of an imaginary policy on quality. The experiment was performed for three dif-
ferent scenarios in which the probability of treatment was (1) unrelated to pre-interven-
tion performance; (2) positively correlated with pre-intervention levels of
performance; and (3) positively correlated with pre-intervention trends in perfor-
mance. We estimated alternative DID models that varied with respect to the choice of
data intervals, the comparison group, and the method of obtaining inference. We
assessed estimator bias as the mean absolute deviation between estimated program
effects and their true value. We evaluated the accuracy of inferences through statistical
power and rates of false rejection of the null hypothesis.
Principal Findings. Performance of alternative specifications varied dramatically
when the probability of treatment was correlated with pre-intervention levels or trends.
In these cases, propensity score matching resulted in much more accurate point esti-
mates. The use of permutation tests resulted in lower false rejection rates for the highly
biased estimators, but the use of clustered standard errors resulted in slightly lower false
rejection rates for the matching estimators.
Conclusions. When treatment and comparison groups differed on pre-intervention
levels or trends, our results supported specifications for DID models that include
matching for more accurate point estimates and models using clustered standard errors
or permutation tests for better inference. Based on our findings, we propose a checklist
for DID analysis.
Key Words. Hospitals, econometrics, health economics, quality of care, health
policy
Health care delivery in the United States is changing at a dramatic pace. Mil-
lions of uninsured citizens, unsustainable cost growth, and uneven quality of
care have prompted numerous policy responses at the state and national level.
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The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act includes landmark
expansions to health insurance and the introduction of delivery system
reforms to reduce costs and improve quality. Evaluating the effectiveness of
these efforts is essential in understanding what works—and what doesn’t—so
policy can be redesigned accordingly. Randomized control trials, the gold
standard for understanding causal relationships, are impractical or impossible
in many circumstances, and are rarely used to evaluate public policies or
large-scale delivery system interventions. To maximize learning from this rap-
idly changing environment, observational studies are needed.
There are many challenges, however, in drawing valid conclusions from
observational study designs. Difference-in-differences methods have emerged
as a powerful tool to address confounding in observational studies and evalu-
ate the impact of health care policies. Although the implementation of differ-
ence-in-differences models can be complex, the idea is simple. First, identify
an intervention, an outcome of interest, and two groups—one that was
exposed to the intervention (the treatment group) and one that was not (the
comparison group). Then, take the difference in the outcome between
the treatment and comparison groups at baseline (difference 1) and again
after the intervention (difference 2) has occurred. The policy effect is estimated
as the difference-in-differences (difference 2—difference 1).
We can conclude that the intervention had an impact if the outcome
changed more for the treatment group than the comparison group. If the dif-
ferences are the same between the two groups, then there was no effect of the
intervention (see Figure 1). For example, a recent study used difference-in-dif-
ferences methods to evaluate the impact of Medicare’s bariatric surgery cover-
age decision, which limited Medicare reimbursement to “Centers of
Excellence.” The study compared rates of surgical complications in Medicare
patients (whose care was subject to the policy) and commercially insured
patients (whose care was not subject to the intervention) before and after the
policy was initiated in 2006. Prior studies, using a simple “pre-post” study
design found a beneficial impact of the Centers of Excellence program, but
had failed to account for secular trends toward improved outcomes (Nguyen
et al. 2010; Flum et al. 2011). Using difference-in-differences, we found simi-
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lar declines in complications for both the Medicare and commercially insured
patients, suggesting that the program did not lead to a reduction in complica-
tions (Dimick et al. 2013).
The increasing popularity of difference-in-differences in health policy
and medicine (Figure 2) is a result of both the credibility of these designs and
their ease of implementation and estimation (Angrist and Pischke 2010).
Recent difference-in-differences studies have evaluated the impact of health
insurance expansions (Cunningham, Hadley, and Reschovsky 2002; Zhu
et al. 2010; Long and Stockley 2011; Blum et al. 2012; Cantor et al. 2012;
Graves and Gruber 2012; Dhingra et al. 2013; Joynt et al. 2013), high deduct-
ible health plans (Wharam et al. 2012; Kozhimannil et al. 2013), changes in
payment policy and providers’ financial incentives (Shen and Zuckerman
2005; Dusheiko et al. 2006; Mitchell 2008; Scanlon et al. 2008; Song et al.
2011; Jha et al. 2012; Sutton et al. 2012; Kantarevic and Kralj 2013; Werner,
Konetzka, and Polsky 2013), malpractice reform (Kessler, Sage, and Becker
2005), behavioral health parity laws (Goldman et al. 2006; Azrin et al. 2007),
resident work hour reform (Volpp et al. 2007), public quality reporting (Dra-
Figure 1: Conceptual Depiction of Difference-in-Differences Analysis
Note: Difference-in-differences estimate is equal to: (T2-C2)—(T1-C1).
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nove et al. 2003; Chen andMeinecke 2012; Joynt et al. 2012; Ryan, Nallamo-
thu, and Dimick 2012b), changes in clinical practice (Baxter, Ray, and Fire-
man 2010; Zivin et al. 2010; Leonhardt et al. 2011; Suehs et al. 2014),
smoking laws (Anger, Kvasnicka, and Siedler 2011; Nguyen 2013), electronic
medical record implementation ( Jones et al. 2010; McCullough, Christian-
son, and Leerapan 2013), and conflict of interest policies (Epstein et al. 2013).
ASSUMPTIONS AND ESTIMATION FOR DIFFERENCE-IN-
DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS
Point estimates of policy effects using difference-in-differences can be gener-
ated by simply calculating the difference in means for a given outcome
between treatment and comparison groups, before and after the intervention
was initiated. However, regression models make it possible to test whether dif-
ference-in-differences estimates are statistically significant. Regression models
Figure 2: Health Policy andMedicineArticles UsingDifference-in-Differences
Analysis, 1997–2012
Source: PubMed database. Search term “difference-in-differences” or “difference-in-difference.”
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also allow researchers to develop more advanced specifications for difference-
in-differences analysis, which may improve the accuracy of point estimates
and statistical inference.
Because difference-in-difference analysis is implemented using regres-
sion analysis, these methods are subject to standard statistical assumptions
(e.g., Gauss-Markov assumptions for linear regression) (Wooldridge 2009).
The additional key assumptions for difference-in-difference analysis are the
“common shocks” and “parallel trends” assumptions (Angrist and Pischke
2008). The common shocks assumption holds that other phenomena occur-
ring at the same time or after the start of treatment will equally affect the treat-
ment and comparison groups. The parallel trends assumptions says that,
although treatment and comparison groups may have different levels of the
outcome prior to the start of treatment, their trends in pretreatment outcomes
should be the same (Figure 1). The parallel trends assumption implies that,
absent treatment, outcomes for the treatment and comparison groups are
expected to change at the same rate. Thus, any difference in the differences in
outcomes between groups can be attributed to the policy, rather than to differ-
ential pre-existing trends in outcomes. With multiple pre-intervention peri-
ods, the parallel trends assumption is often examined by statistically testing
whether linear pre-intervention trends are statistically different between the
treatment and comparison groups (Ryan 2009).
As an example, consider an evaluation of a policy that provided techni-
cal assistance to improve mortality rates among U.S. hospitals for which 30
percent or more of their discharges were from Medicaid. No hospitals were
eligible to receive the intervention in the pre-intervention period, some hospi-
tals were eligible to receive treatment in the postintervention, and data exist
for all hospitals in both periods. There are two general cases in which differ-
ence-in-differences analysis could be applied to this evaluation question. First
is the “group-level” difference-in-differences specification in which data exist
at the level at which treatment occurs (e.g., hospital-level mortality rates). For
hospital j at time t, we would estimate:
Yjt ¼ b0 þ b1postt þ dðtreatmentj  posttÞ þ uj þ ejt ð1Þ
where treatment is a dummy variable indicating whether a hospital received
the treatment in period 2, post is a dummy variable for whether an observation
occurred in the postintervention period, u is a vector of hospital fixed effects,
and e is the idiosyncratic error term. Because the equation includes hospital
fixed effects, and because the treatment is time invariant, we do not include a
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main effect for treatment. Estimating this equation with linear regression yields
the following interpretation for d^:
d^ ¼ðMortalitytreat ;post Mortalitytreat ;preÞ
ðMortalitycomp;post Mortalitycomp;preÞ
ð2Þ
where “treat” and “comp” denote the treatment and comparison groups. As
shown by equation (2), d^ provides the difference-in-differences estimate of the
policy effect. DID estimates are typically considered to be average treatment
effects on the treated, rather than average treatment effects. This is because
DID estimates are generally thought of as applying to a particular group that
was treated (rather than to a population that could have been treated).
Second is the “micro-level” difference-in-differences in which data exist
at a lower level nested within the treatment unit (e.g., patient-level mortality
within hospitals). For patient i in hospital j at time t, we estimate:
Yijt ¼ b0 þ b1postt þ b2Xijt þ dðtreatmentj  posttÞ þ uj þ eijt ð3Þ
where Xijt is a set of patient-level severity adjusters and all other terms are
defined as before. The interpretation of d^ is the same as in equation (2). Note
that, by testing for changes in mortality within hospitals over time, this specifi-
cation accounts for any compositional differences resulting from where
patients receive care over time (i.e., lower mortality hospitals receiving a
greater share of patients in the post period). A variation on the micro-level
specification is to replace hospital fixed effects with a set of hospital character-
istics and include amain effect for treatment.
The group-level and micro-level DID models give rise to somewhat dif-
ferent issues. In group-level DID models, variation over time in the composi-
tion of groups can confound estimates of the program effect. This is why the
group-level outcomes are often adjusted prior to estimation (e.g., risk-adjusted
mortality). One advantage of the micro-level specification is the potential to
control for individual heterogeneity with the vector X. This may reduce the
variance estimate of d^ and can also account for time-varying differences in
patient severity across the treatment and comparison groups. Also, while each
hospital receives equal weight in the group-level specification (equation 1),
hospitals in which more patients are treated would receive more weight for
the micro-level specification (equation 2). Both the microlevel and group-
level DID specifications are subject to autocorrelation and clustering of errors,
creating challenges for statistical inference (Bertrand, Duflo, andMullainathan
2002).
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SPECIFICATION CHOICES FOR DIFFERENCE-IN-
DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS: A SIMULATION STUDY
The theoretical underpinnings of DID are well understood (Wooldridge
2002; Angrist and Pischke 2008). What is less known is how well the assump-
tions of DID hold up in empirical practice and what can be done for more
robust estimation and inference when the assumptions don’t hold. In DID
models, point estimates should be correct and variance estimates should
appropriately reflect the uncertainty in parameter estimates due to sampling
variation. Most research related to specification in difference-in-differences
has focused on the issues related to the variance estimates of program effects
(Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2002; Donald and Lang 2007). However,
specification choices related to obtaining accurate point estimates in differ-
ence-in-differences models—including the choice of comparison groups, the
choice of the pre-intervention time interval, and addressing violations to the
“parallel trends” assumption—have received scant attention in the literature.
Researchers do not have good guides to implement difference-in-differences
analyses.
We address specification questions related to difference-in-differences
analysis by conducting a Monte-Carlo simulation experiment. We use hospi-
tal-level data on quality of care from Hospital Compare between 2004 and
2009. For each hospital in each year, we measure quality of care using a com-
posite measure of process-of-care quality from 37 individual measures. The
composite is created by using the “opportunities model,” which is calculated
as the sum of successfully achieved measures divided by the sum of opportuni-
ties that practices have to achieve these measures (Landrum, Bronskill, and
Normand 2000). This quality measure is expressed as a percentage. We
exclude hospitals without quality data in each year. We also exclude hospitals
that participated in the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration, as
these hospitals experienced greater quality improvement during part of the
study period (Ryan, Blustein, and Casalino 2012a). Our final data file includes
3,192 hospitals.
We use these data to estimate the effect of an imaginary policy, initiated
in 2007 and continuing through 2009. To do this, we randomly assign hospi-
tals to treatment and comparison groups in 2007. We then assume different
effects of the imaginary intervention, ranging from no effect, a “small” effect
(+0.2 standard deviations, or +2.3 percentage points), or a “medium” effect
(+0.5 standard deviations, or +5.8 percentage points) (Cohen 1988). We add
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these assumed effects to the actual quality scores for those hospitals in the
treatment group after the intervention has begun.1
We randomly assign hospitals to treatment using three scenarios (Fig-
ure 3). In the first scenario, each hospital has an equal probability of being
assigned to the treatment or comparison group. Assignment is completely ran-
dom and unrelated to performance in the pre-intervention period. In the sec-
ond scenario, pre-intervention performance is associated positively with the
probability of assignment to the program: hospitals in the bottom quartile of
pre-intervention performance have a 35 percent probability of assignment to
treatment increasing by 10 percentage points for each quartile up to 65 percent
for hospitals in the highest quartile of pre-intervention performance. Recent
research highlights that higher pre-intervention quality performance can affect
the expectation for change in quality (Ryan and Blustein 2011; Ryan, Blustein,
and Casalino 2012a). The third scenario is similar to the second scenario,
except that the probability of assignment to treatment is associated positively
with pre-intervention trends in quality, rather than levels. Hospitals in the bot-
tom quartile (those with the weakest trends toward improved performance)
have a 35 percent probability of assignment to treatment increasing by 10 per-
centage points for each quartile up to 65 percent for hospitals in the highest
quartile (strongest trends toward improved performance).
We then estimate the impact of the imaginary policy using group-level
difference-in-differences (equation 1). We perform this analysis using alterna-
tive specifications. First, we vary the data used in the analysis: (1) using hospi-
tal-level data from all observations (multiple pre and post-intervention
periods); (2) collapsing data into two periods by averaging performance within
a single pre and a single post-intervention period; and (3) using data from only
the last pre-intervention and the first post-intervention observation.
Second, we estimate the effect of the intervention using alternative com-
parison groups: (1) using all non-treated hospitals as comparison hospitals and
(2) using propensity score matched comparison hospitals. Differences in levels
or trends prior to the start of an intervention between treatment and compari-
son groups may result in different expectations for changes in outcomes, and
matching can alleviate this concern. Propensity score matching is performed
using one-to-one matching (with replacement), calipers of 1.0 (0.09 of the
pooled standard deviation), and enforcing common support. Common sup-
port excludes observations from hospitals with propensity score values that
are above the maximum value or below the minimum value of that of the
comparison group’s propensity score distribution. Lagged levels of quality for
each year prior to the start of the intervention were used for matching. The
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Figure 3: Pre-Intervention Levels and Trends under Different Assignment
Scenarios
Note: Data are based on average levels across 200 simulation iterations for each scenario.
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matching procedure was implemented in Stata using a user-written command
(Leuven and Sianesi 2003).
Third, we use alternative approaches to address differences in pre-exist-
ing trends between treatment and comparison groups (Angrist and Pischke
2008; Besley and Burgess 2004): (1) do not model trends; and (2) model differ-
ential trends using treatment and comparison group-specific pre-intervention
dummies. The specification that modeled trends in outcomes took the follow-
ing form:
Yjt ¼ b0 þ b1year pret þ b2ðtreatmentj  year pretÞ þ b3postt
þ dðtreatmentj  postt Þ þ uj þ ejt
ð4Þ
where year pre is a vector of dummy variables for each pre-intervention
period.
Three alternative approaches are used to test for statistical significance:
(1) assume that errors are identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.); (2)
use clustered standard errors (Rogers 1993) to account for heteroskedasticity
at the hospital-level; and (3) perform permutation tests. Permutation tests are
nonparametric methods recommended for exact inference in situations in
which assumptions underlying other variance estimators may be violated
(Ernst 2004). These tests reassign groups to treatment and control conditions
and then recalculate program effects under the different permuted conditions.
These alternative program effects form a “randomization distribution,”
which is then evaluated to obtain inference. Permutation tests have been
recommended for difference-in-differences analysis (Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan 2002; Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010). In this study,
permutation tests are performed using 49 random permutations of the data.
We combine these specification features, ultimately choosing six alterna-
tive difference-in-differences specifications to compare (Table 1). For each
specification, our analysis yields point estimates of the magnitude of the policy
effect as well as tests of the statistical significance (a ≤ .05) of the policy using
the three alternative strategies for inference. Our simulation study performs
this analysis for 200 simulation iterations using each of the three assignment
scenarios. For each simulation iteration, we capture the rate of false rejection
(i.e., type II error), the rate of rejection from “small” and “medium” program
effects, and the mean absolute deviation (Pham-Gia and Hung 2001) between
estimated program effects and their true value, a measure of estimator bias.
We report the mean absolute deviation because it provides a clear interpreta-
tion of the magnitude of the estimator bias in units of the dependent variable.
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Our procedure is similar to that used by Bertrand and colleagues to evaluate
the properties of variance estimates using alternative difference-in-difference
specifications (Bertrand, Duflo, andMullainathan 2002).
All analysis was performed using Stata 12.0 (Stata Corp., College
Station, TX, USA). The program used to conduct the simulation study can be
found in Appendix A.
Results from the Simulation Study
Table 1 shows the results from the simulation experiment from Scenario 1, in
which hospital assignment to treatment is completely random. To the left of
the table, the specification description shows the data that were used, the
choice of comparison group, how trends were modeled, and the method for
determining statistical inference. The right of the table shows rate of rejection
when there is no effect (the rate of false rejection), a small effect, and a medium
effect, as well as the mean absolute deviation between the estimated point esti-
mate and the true program effect.
For Scenario 1, alternative specifications have a relatively minor impact
on rejection rates and the estimator bias. Estimator bias is similar across the
specifications using different comparison groups and those modeling and not
modeling pre-intervention trends in performance. Statistical power to detect
small effects was similar across the specifications, although somewhat lower
when using permutation tests. The one meaningful difference across specifica-
tions was that specifications that assume i.i.d. errors tend to have higher rates
of false rejection than specifications using clustered standard errors and those
using permutation tests for inference. These results highlight that when treat-
ment is unrelated to the pre-intervention levels or trends, specification in DID
does not substantively affect model inference.
Table 2 shows the results from Scenario 2, in which hospitals with higher
levels of quality performance prior to the intervention were more likely to be
assigned to treatment. A few key patterns emerge about the performance of
alternative specifications. First, the two specifications that use a matched com-
parison group have much lower estimator bias: the mean absolute deviation
values are .0025 and .0019 for these specifications that model and do not
model trends, respectively. The bias of the other estimators is between 4 and 7
times higher than the matching estimators. Second, specifications using per-
mutation tests have the lowest rate of false rejection for four of the six specifi-
cations. The differences in false rejection rates are more pronounced for
specifications that have greater bias. However, for the matching estimators,
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the specifications using clustered standard errors had somewhat lower false
rejection rates (e.g., 1.5 percent vs. 9.0 percent for the specification that did not
model trends). Statistical power to detect small effects was much lower when
using permutation tests with the highly biased estimators, but identical when
using the matching estimators.
Table 3 shows the results from Scenario 3, in which hospitals with stron-
ger trends toward quality improvement prior to the intervention were more
likely to be assigned to treatment. Similar to Scenario 2, it shows that the speci-
fications using the matched comparison group have lower estimator bias: the
mean absolute deviation values are .0023 for these specifications, which is 2–
10 times lower than the other specifications. As in Scenario 2, permutation
tests tend to have lower rates of false rejection in the specifications with more
bias, while inference based on clustered standard errors is somewhat better
for the matching estimators. Statistical power is nearly identical across the
estimators.
Overall, our simulation study found that, when treatment was randomly
assigned, the bias of alternative DID specifications was approximately equiva-
lent. However, when the probability of treatment was correlated with pre-
intervention levels or trends, propensity score matching resulted in much
more accurate point estimates. The use of permutation tests resulted in lower
false rejection rates for the highly biased estimators, but the use of clustered
standard errors resulted in slightly lower false rejection rates for the matching
estimators. In all specifications, standard errors that assumed that errors were
identically and independently distributed resulted in elevated rates of false
rejection. Despite substantial differences in the data generating process, our
study found that specifications that included clustered standard errors or used
permutation tests for statistical inference resulted in similar rates of false rejec-
tion that have been documented elsewhere (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullaina-
than 2002).
Limitations of the Simulation Study
The inferences about specification in difference-in-differences models from
our simulation study may not generalize to estimation in other datasets. For
instance, differences in pre-intervention levels and trends between treatment
and comparison groups may not have a similar impact on inference in other
settings. Quality performance data are top-coded at 100 percent in Hospital
Compare, and prior research shows strong evidence of nonlinear rates of
improvement as hospitals approach the maximum score. These features of the
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data generating process make inference strongly susceptible to bias from dif-
ferences in pre-intervention levels and trends between treatment and compari-
son groups. However, difference-in-differences studies in health care
frequently evaluate limited dependent variables (e.g., mortality rates) that
likely display similar patterns.
Our study is also limited by our choice of alternative program effects
and specification features to compare. Other econometric methods, such as
the synthetic control estimator (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010),
the nonlinear “change in changes”model (Athey and Imbens 2006), and other
statistical matching estimators (Diamond and Sekhon 2013), may be superior
to the estimators evaluated in this study. We also did not consider the proper-
ties of microlevel difference-in-differences estimators. While the greater num-
ber of observations in microlevel can increase statistical power, these models
also have especially high rates of false rejection (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullai-
nathan 2002). It is therefore possible that permutation tests may provide more
reliable inference in these cases (Ernst 2004). Future research should consider
the performance of difference-in-differences estimators using a broader range
of specification features, outcomes, heterogeneous program effects, and differ-
ent datasets.
THE DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES CHECKLIST
Based on the results of our analysis, we propose a difference-in-differences
checklist, identifying the critical conditions that must be met to be able to
make valid inferences using this analytic approach (Table 4). Checklists are
being developed to promulgate high quality methods (e.g., the PRISMA
checklist for systematic reviews [Moher et al. 2009] and the GRACE checklist
for comparative effectiveness research [Dreyer et al. 2014]). In Appendix A,
we provide sample code to conduct the specification tests described in the
checklist.
Implementing a difference-in-differences design requires longitudinal
data on groups exposed and not exposed to an intervention. Therefore, data
must exist on study outcomes for groups exposed and not exposed to an inter-
vention, both before and after the intervention was implemented (Element 1).
The key strength of the difference-in-differences design is that the comparison
group serves as the “counterfactual” for the treatment group; that is, the com-
parison group gives an estimate for the postintervention outcome of the treat-
ment group had they not received the intervention. The ability of the
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Table 4: Elements of Difference-in-Differences Checklist
Confirm That How to Test What To Do If Violated
1. Data exist on study outcomes
for at least one observation
period among groups exposed
and not exposed to an intervention,
both before and after the intervention
was implemented
Directly observable NA
2. Trends in outcome performance
prior to an intervention are “parallel”
between treatment and comparison
groups
Test equivalence of linear
trends between treatment
and comparison groups
prior to intervention by
testing the significance
of the interaction term
between the time trend
and the treatment group
If multiple comparison
groups are available,
match treatment
and comparison units
3. Baseline outcome levels are unrelated
to expectations for changes in outcomes
For both treatment and
comparison groups,
test whether baseline
outcome is correlated
with change in
performance across
the study period
If multiple comparison
groups are available,
match treatment and
comparison units
4. Violations to standard statistical
assumptions are appropriately addressed
Test for violations of
homoscedasticity of
standard errors.(Breusch
and Pagan 1979; Drukker
2003)
Permutation tests or
clustered standard
errors will likely
result in the most
accurate statistical
inference when using
difference-in-
difference analysis
5. Events or factors other than treatment,
occurring at the time of treatment,
do not differentially affect
outcomes for treatment and
comparison groups
Not directly testable NA
6. The composition of treatment
and comparison groups does
not change over the course
of the study
Test for difference in
observed covariates
between treatment
and comparison rates
before and after the
intervention. Test for
differential drop-out
rates between treatment
and comparison groups.
(Hausman andWise 1979)
Control for differences
in observed
covariates between
treatment and
comparison rates
before and after
the intervention
Continued
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comparison group to provide this counterfactual requires that trends in out-
come performance prior to an intervention are “parallel” between treatment
and comparison groups (Element 2). If the treatment and comparison groups
have parallel trends prior to the intervention, then there is a reasonable expec-
tation that, absent the intervention, outcomes in the treatment group would
change at a similar rate to outcomes in the comparison group (Figure 1). In
our simulation study, when hospitals with stronger trends toward improve-
ment were more likely to receive treatment (Scenario 3), point estimates using
standard difference-in-differences estimation (equation 1) had greater bias.
Matching treatment and comparison units on pre-intervention levels of per-
formance greatly reduced this bias.
While baseline levels of the outcome do not need to be the same for
treatment and comparison groups, it is crucial that baseline outcome levels are
unrelated to expectations for changes in outcomes (Element 3). This element
remains valid even if there are parallel trends between treatment and compari-
son groups in the pre-intervention period (Element 2). For instance, because
many of the hospitals participating in Medicare’s hospital pay-for-perfor-
mance demonstration began with higher performance than comparison hospi-
tals and achieved nearly perfect performance on the incentivized clinical
process performance measures, it was challenging for researchers to identify
the longer term effects of the program given these ceiling effects (Ryan, Blu-
stein, and Casalino 2012a). Relatedly, if the treatment group is selected on the
basis of previous performance (high or low) on the outcome, there is potential
bias from regression to the mean (Chay, McEwan, and Urquiola 2005). We
found that when hospitals with higher levels of pre-intervention performance
were more likely to receive treatment (Scenario 2), point estimates using stan-
dard difference-in-differences estimation (equation 1) also had greater bias.
Again, matching treatment and comparison group on pre-intervention levels
greatly reduced bias.
Table 4. Continued
Confirm That How to Test What To Do If Violated
7. Treatment does not “spill-over”
from treatment group to
comparison group
Test whether comparison
group experiences
deviation from existing
trend concurrent
with intervention
If multiple comparison
groups are available,
choose alternative
comparison group
that is not subject
to spillovers
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Because difference-in-differences designs require researchers to perform
longitudinal data analysis using regression techniques and it is critical that vio-
lations to standard statistical assumptions are appropriately addressed (Ele-
ment 4). This includes appropriately estimating treatment effects when using
nonlinear models (e.g., logistic regression) (Ai and Norton 2003) and account-
ing for clustering and other violations of independence when estimating stan-
dard errors (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2002). Our simulation study
strongly supports the use of clustered standard errors and permutation tests
for statistical inference in difference-in-difference analysis.
Several other elements of the checklist are not informed by our simula-
tion study, but instead by conceptual issues related to causal inference in the
context of different-in-differences studies. For instance, because difference-in-
differences methods seek to identify the impact of a specific policy or interven-
tion, events or factors other than treatment, occurring at the time of treatment,
should not differentially affect outcomes for treatment and comparison groups
(Element 5). Although this “common shocks” assumption is generally not test-
able, researchers should attempt to identify factors other than the treatment
being studied that may have affected outcomes for either the treatment of
comparison groups. For instance, if groups self-selected to receive treatment,
it is possible that outcomes for this group would have improved even without
treatment. This “expected gains bias” is a result of changes in unobserved fac-
tors over the study period. Selection into the study at the start of the program
could signal that the treatment group had an increased unobserved interest in
improving the study outcome that is concomitant with the start of the pro-
gram. Hence, it may be the changing unobservable, rather than the program
itself, that led to any effect.
Relatedly, in cases in which researchers seek to estimate the effects of
programs for which treatment does not occur at the same time for all treated
units, specifications should be modified to avoid confounding secular time-
trends with staggered implementation. For instance, for a case with three post-
intervention periods, a separate treatment effect can be estimated for each
postintervention period. Here, the “treatment” group remains in the “compar-
ison” group until the time in which they receive treatment. A linear combina-
tion of estimated effects can be used to generate an overall program effect. A
variation on this specification can account for continuously “rolling” treat-
ment commencement dates (see Ryan et al. 2013).
Difference-in-differences designs also rest on the assumption that all
unobserved factors affecting outcomes between the treatment and comparison
groups do not change over time. Therefore, the composition of treatment and
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comparison groups should not change over the course of the study (Element
6). If these groups do change, potentially due to differential drop out between
treatment and comparison groups, study inference could be biased. Research-
ers should statistically adjust for differences in characteristics of nested obser-
vations (e.g., patients) between treatment and comparison groups to mitigate
the effects of compositional changes.
For the difference-in-differences design to be valid, the comparison
group cannot be affected by the intervention. In other words, treatment does
not “spill-over” from treatment group to comparison group (Element 7). For
example, consider a study evaluating the impact of public quality reporting in
Hospital Compare on 30-day mortality rates in Medicare beneficiaries. The
treatment group consists of Medicare patients receiving care for publicly
reported diagnoses in US hospitals, and the comparison group consists of
Medicare patients treated for conditions that were not publicly reported
(Ryan, Nallamothu, and Dimick 2012b). If public quality reporting resulted in
broad changes in hospital practice that improved mortality for diagnoses and
conditions that were both publicly reported and not publicly reported,
then the use of this comparison group would result in bias (toward the null
hypothesis).
CONCLUSION
Difference-in-differences methods have emerged as some of the most popular
and rigorous methods to estimate the impact of medical and health policy
interventions. However, limited attention has been given to how specification
choices in difference-in-differences models affect inference. Results from our
simulation experiment suggest that specification choices can have a major
impact on the point estimates and statistical significance of estimated policy
effects. A difference-in-differences checklist, based in part on our simulation
study, provides a guide to practice for empirical researchers wishing to use
these methods.
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NOTE
1. Performance on the quality measures is top coded at 100, indicating perfect compli-
ance. In our study, by adding program effects to hospitals’ actual scores, we allow
measure performance to exceed 100 for hospitals that are assigned to treatment.
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